

Message Text

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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SUBJECT: THE SOVIETS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: REPRISE

REF: (A) SINGAPORE 3801, (B) JAKARTA 10450, (C) RANGOON 2391,
(D) KUALA LUMPUR 4347, (E) MOSCOW 7247

THE WISDOM AND WIT OF THE COMMENTARY FROM OUR COLLEAGUES
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (REFTELS) HAS AGAIN LIVENED UP A DULL
MOSCOW SUMMER AND PROVIDED A SHARPER FOCUS ON WHERE WE
AND OTHERS CURRENTLY STAND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. AT THE RISK
OF REDUNDANCY AND OF REPEATING WHAT WE HAVE SAID PREVIOUSLY
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ON THIS SUBJECT, WE WOULD ADD A FEW FURTHER POINTS:

-- THE REGION IS FAR FROM THE SOVIET HEARTLAND, AND THUS OF RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY IN SOVIET POLICY FORMULATION. COMMENTING ON THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE HANOI-ASEAN DIFFERENCES LAST FEBRUARY, MIKHAIL KAPITSA JOKINGLY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT U.S. ANALYSTS TEND TO SEE A GRAND DESIGN IN EVERY SOVIET UTTERANCE, WHEREAS, IN FACT, "WE DON'T EVEN HAVE A POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA." THE POINT, WHILE OVERSTATED, WAS THAT SOVIET POLICY SINCE THE FALL OF INDOCHINA HAS BEEN SUBJECT TO CONFLICTING PRESSURES AND HAS TENDED TO FOLLOW RATHER THAN TO LEAD;

-- MOSCOW'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO GAIN INFLUENCE, OR AT LEAST TO LIMIT ITS POTENTIAL LOSSES, ESPECIALLY VIS-A-VIS CHINA. BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE AT SOME POINT TO MOVE BEYOND SIMPLY LIMITING LOSSES AND SUPPORTING HANOI TO A MORE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. THIS IS NEITHER SURPRISING NOR ALARMING IN ITSELF. IT DOES MEAN (AS EMBASSY SINGAPORE POINTS OUT) THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO ALL THEY CAN TO EXPAND THEIR PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. BUT THEIR DEGREE OF SUCCESS WILL DEPEND ON HOW RESPONSIVE THE ASIANS WHO LIVE THERE ARE, AND THE NATURE OF THE REGION AS WELL AS THE CAUTIOUS REACTIONS THUS FAR SUGGEST THAT THE ASIANS WILL NOT BE EASILY SEDUCED;

-- PRESENCE MAY NOT EQUATE WITH INFLUENCE, BUT IT COMES CLOSE IN SOVIET EYES. THUS WE CAN EXPECT MORE SOVIET AID OFFERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO FILL WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE THE VACUUM LEFT BEHIND BY THE U.S. RETREAT. WE WILL ALSO SEE MORE SOVIET SHIP-DAYS IN AND AROUND SEA AS SOVIET DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY GROWS. INTERESTS, IN THIS CASE, MAY WELL FOLLOW THE FLEET;

-- FURTHER, WHAT THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE AS A U.S. SHIFT TO THE ISLANDS AND THE HIGH SEAS WILL CALL FORTH A COMPETITIVE REACTION FROM THE SOVIETS. THEIR MOVES IN RECENT MONTHS TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS AND TO SEEK FACILITIES IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC ARE A PART OF THIS COMPETITION.

-- THE UNCHARACTERISTIC SOVIET "LIGHTHANDEDNESS" IN BURMA AND THE PROXY BENEFITS MOSCOW HAS GAINED BY
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HANOI'S IMPROVED TIES IN THE REGION ARE AMONG THE GROWING SIGNS OF SOVIET SUBTLETY IN DEALING WITH THE REGION. THIS SUBTLETY WILL INCREASE OVER THE YEARS AS A NEW GENERATION OF WELL-TRAINED LANGUAGE OFFICERS TAKES OVER SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE AREA.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE PLEASED WITH THE POST-VIETNAM SCENE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE REGION POSES NO THREAT TO IMPORTANT SOVIET INTERESTS, AND CHINA HAS

NOT GAINED MEASURABLY. YET MOSCOW PROBABLY EXPECTED
MORE FROM THE SHOCK OF HANOI'S VICTORY, AND THE LOSS
OF PRESTIGE FOR THE U.S. IN THE AREA MAY HAVE LED
SOVIET ANALYSTS TO SEE THE WHEEL OF HISTORY TURNING
THEIR WAY. IF SO, THEY ARE PROBABLY SOMEWHAT DIS-
APPOINTED THAT THE WHEEL HAS NOT SWUNG MORE IN THEIR
DIRECTION THAN HAS ACTUALLY BEEN THE CASE. STOESSEL

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